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Non-government organizations and policy makers agree that the best route to eradicating the 
widespread discrimination and poverty among the Roma is to improve the quality of and access 
to education. A cursory glance at the Hungarian Government website suggests that policy 
makers are on top of the problem with good laws and initiatives in place. Yet, indicators from 
non-government groups and academics suggest the situation remains bleak for the Roma, and 
practices such as the segregation of Roma school children persist. Progressive change in 
Hungary first requires a serious confrontation of the widespread and deeply ingrained racism 
against the Roma. This paper makes no attempt at such an ambition; however, the paper aims 
to begin acknowledging the role race plays in populist radical right discourses about education 
policies in Hungary using a discourse analysis method informed by Critical Race Theory. The 
paper advances two arguments. First, there is a mismatch between official policy and actual 
progress on Roma education. Second, an examination of how populist radical right discourses 
about the Roma are racialized provides insight into why there is a mismatch. 
 
Les organisations non-gouvernementales et les décideurs publiques sont d’accord pour dire que 
la meilleure façon d’éliminer la discrimination répandue contre les Roms et la pauvreté 
généralisée dans laquelle ils vivent est d’améliorer la qualité de l’éducation qu’ils reçoivent et 
leur accès à celle-ci. Un examen rapide du site web du gouvernement hongrois laisse penser que 
les décideurs publiques maitrisent la situation grâce à des lois et des initiatives judicieuses. 
Toutefois, les indicateurs provenant de groupes non-gouvernementaux et de chercheurs portent 
à croire que la situation des Roms demeure sombre et que des pratiques telles la ségrégation des 
élèves roms persiste. Avant de connaitre une évolution positive en Hongrie, il est nécessaire 
d’affronter efficacement le racisme généralisé et profondément ancré contre les Roms. Cet 
article ne prétend pas entretenir une telle ambition; il veut plutôt commencer à reconnaitre le 
rôle que joue la race dans les discours de groupes populistes d’extrême droite évoquant les 
politiques hongroises en matière d’éducation. La méthode employée est celle d’une analyse du 
discours appuyée par la théorie critique axée sur la relation entre la race et la loi. L’article fait 
deux affirmations : d’abord, il y a une inadéquation entre la politique officielle et les progrès réel 
quant à l’éducation des Roms et deuxièmement, un examen de la racisation des discours de 
groupes populistes d’extrême droite portant sur les Roms offrent des explications sur l’existence 
de cette inadéquation. 
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Introduction 
 
This article focuses on the problem of discrimination and educational outcomes for Roma 
children in Hungary. While there are several minority groups in Hungary, the largest minority 
group is the Roma. The Minority Rights Group International (2012) notes that some groups 
estimate that the Roma comprise 9 to 10% of Hungary's total population, which was 9,877,364 
in 2014 according to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2015). The Roma are also the 
most persecuted group in Hungary (and Central Eastern Europe) facing deeply rooted 
discrimination at the state and social level, a situation which has drawn much criticism from the 
European Union (EU) and international community (Mudde, 2005). This is troubling because 
the health of minority rights and protection is a key component of a successful and healthy 
democracy where all citizens are represented and have the opportunity to fully participate in 
social and political life (Article 2, Treaty of the European Union, 2012). In response, the 
countries of Central Eastern Europe (CEE) that are EU members have ratified several 
international conventions regarding minorities, such as the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (Mudde, 2005). A notable internationally led effort is the 
2005-2015 Decade of Roma Inclusion. NGOs and policy makers agree that the best route to 
eradicating the widespread discrimination and poverty among the Roma is to improve the 
quality of and access to education. A cursory glance at the Hungarian Government website 
suggests that policy makers are on top of the problem with good laws and initiatives in place. 
Yet, indicators from NGOs and academics suggest the situation remains bleak for the Roma, and 
exclusionary practices such as the segregation of Roma school children persist. 
A Critical Race Theory (CRT) approach to legal rights offers an explanation of the 
disjuncture between policy and practice. CRT scholars insist that legal rights on paper are a 
good start, but not enough to impart meaningful social change on their own (Delgado & 
Stefancic, 2012; Williams, 1991, 1995; Bell, 1990). The racism experienced by the Roma 
community is entrenched within public discourses, attitudes, and institutions, and with the rise 
of the populist radical right these problems seem to be increasing. Racialized discourses are 
inherently exclusionary, therefore never neutral, and can bring minority issues to the forefront, 
shape public attitudes, and influence and justify policies. Illuminating potential problems and 
barriers for success within education policy requires a consideration of the wider social context. 
If discourses about the Roma can be understood as racialized, meaning that categories and 
policies are created based on race (despite the diversity of the Roma as an ethnic group), then it 
is reasonable to conclude that education policy aimed at the Roma community is also racialized. 
That means education cannot be disentangled and examined separately from race without 
missing important insights about how the two intersect. It is encouraging that policy makers are 
engaging in discussions about building a stronger education system for the Roma, but education 
is only one piece of a larger puzzle. Progressive change in Hungary first requires a serious 
confrontation of the widespread and deeply ingrained racism against the Roma. In this paper, I 
make no attempt at such an ambition, but, using a discourse analysis method informed by CRT, 
I aim to begin acknowledging the role race plays in populist radical right discourses about 
education policies in Hungary. 
The paper advances two arguments. First, there is a mismatch between official policy and 
actual progress on Roma education. Second, an examination of how populist radical right 
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discourses about the Roma are racialized provides insight into why this is the case. The paper is 
organized as follows. First, in the interest of conceptual clarity, I discuss the features of the 
populist radical right. Next, I explain how the tenets of CRT can inform the discourse analysis 
method used in this study for how the Hungarian government frames the issue in its documents 
and statements. Then, for comparison, I examine EU and Council of Europe documents to 
determine the extent to which the assessment of Hungary's performance matches or contradicts 
Hungary's self assessment. More simply, the paper uncovers how Hungary self-evaluates on 
Roma education policy compared with how the EU and the Council of Europe evaluates 
Hungary. Then, I examine party manifestos and policy statements on Roma through a CRT 
approach to determine how race is used in these discussions. The paper concludes with thoughts 
on strengthening policy efforts, and suggests areas of further study.  
 
Framework of Analysis 
 
The Populist Radical Right (PRR) 
 
Back in the 1970s, the rise of what scholars like Kirkham (1998) call the “new right” dramatically 
changed party politics and policy aims. Drawing on the work of Gunn (1989), Kirkham (1998) 
asserts: "While questions of economic management were central, issues such as the role of the 
state, the family, sexuality, race and national identity became politicized and contested" (p. 245). 
The new right presented an alternative to liberalism (and liberal concerns), and a return to so-
called traditional cultural and social values. In Britain and the United States, the rise of the new 
right came with new articulations of racialized politics and discourses often couched in the 
language of equality and rights (Kirkham, 1998). That meant issues previously outside the 
purview of politics were now matters of the state. Nowadays, racialized politics and discourses 
are still observed throughout Europe, including the post-communist states of Central Eastern 
Europe where the “populist radical right” (PRR) is on the rise. 
Populism, like many concepts used the social sciences, defies easy definition. Most simply, 
populism is understood as an appeal to the “common person,” a “politics for the people” that 
denotes a particular strategy and line of argument that can occur anywhere on the political 
spectrum and is not inherently negative (Blokker, 2005, p. 386; Deegan-Krause & Haughton, 
2009, p. 822). However, the PRR refers to a very specific party family across Europe with 
common elements, such as authoritarian leanings that compromise democratic liberalism and a 
style of populism that excludes certain minority groups from the “the common people” (Pirro, 
2014; Mudde, 2007). Like populism, a right leaning position on the political spectrum is not 
inherently negative for democracy, but radical parties on the far right share common features to 
varying extents. The far or extreme right can be understood as, a "political ideology revolving 
around the myth of a homogenous nation—a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism hostile to 
liberal, pluralistic democracy, with its underlying principles of individualism and universalism" 
(Minkenberg, 2013, p. 11).  
While there are enough commonalities to position the PRR in a single party family, there are 
key differences between Western and Eastern Europe. Gunther and Diamond (2003) note that 
populist parties in CEE often present a strong ideology that suggests they are just as much 
leaders of a social movement as they are political parties. Such rhetoric is often underpinned by 
strong narratives of the past, or historical legacies, conditioned by the particularities of the post-
communist transition to democracy and eventual EU membership (Pirro, 2014, p. 247). As a 
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result, PRR parties in CEE express their ideas about the nation and who belongs in context-
specific ways. Pertinent to this study, indigenous minorities and the Roma are the key targets of 
PRR discourses of exclusion (Pirro, 2014, p. 248). From a Critical Race Theory perspective, the 
next section elaborates on how stories and discourses of exclusion are racialized and how they 
impact policy.  
 
Critical Race Theory 
 
Critical Race Theorists are interested in the role of stories. Implicit in everyday stories are 
narratives about our lives and the “way things are,” which shape our views on how to interpret 
the social and political world around us (Delgado, 2000). Torres (2001-2002) points out that 
individual interpretations of stories can vary greatly according to who is telling the story, who is 
listening, and what “facts” are emphasized and/or omitted. Discourses work the same way. 
While stories and narratives are included, discourses entail entire frameworks of meaning and 
include specialized language, terminology, facts, knowledge, and appropriate practices 
(Foucault, 1969/1972). For Foucault, truth and knowledge are inseparable from power (Brass, 
2000). The implication is that power is situated everywhere in the everyday. In this way, 
discourse is inherently political because power relations are embedded even in the things we 
claim to know, which in turn inform and shape law and policy. The more institutionalized and 
specialized discourses become, the more difficult they are to contest. Taking a CEE example, 
Will Kymlicka (2004) posits that how Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states are 
conceptualized determines if expressions of nationalism are perceived as either a legitimate 
claim of redress or as a revisionist security threat to sovereignty. Policy action is then taken 
accordingly to either work toward justice or to defuse irredentist sentiment. 
A pertinent discourse that CRT scholars focus on is law. Discourses of law are highly 
influential and often unquestioned. Carol Smart (1989) asserts that this is because law is so 
professionalized, exclusive, and conceptualized as being at a higher level from competing 
discourses. It would seem counterintuitive for a layperson to question the elite knowledge and 
expertise of the law. Further, law is understood as fair and unbiased in liberal democracies 
(Bourdieu, 1987). CRT scholars rebut that liberal laws centered on equality, and minority rights 
and opportunities are not neutral or fair when not everyone is starting from an equal point. 
Further, CRT scholars are suspicious of rights as they often fail to address historical and ongoing 
practices of racism and discrimination (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). The contemporary role of 
racism in the law started after the horrors of Nazi Germany. The postwar world order focused on 
equality and human rights, spearheaded by international organizations such as the United 
Nations. Rights on paper, while well intended, can detract attention from new forms of racism 
that are more nuanced and commonplace (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). As a result, racism often 
goes ignored except for extreme cases. To illustrate, Mudde (2005) notes that while public 
officials in CEE have spoken out against racism, it is reactionary to widely publicized incidents 
of violence. Congruent with CRT, "cases of 'everyday racism' have generally been ignored or 
even marginalized. In some instances, it seemed that the main audience was the international 
rather than the national community" (Mudde, 2005, p. 176). 
Extreme and everyday racism are often seen within PRR political climates as issues of 
identity such as race and ethnicity are highly politicized by actors advancing nationalist and 
xenophobic discourse. CRT is appropriate for this study because the approach interrogates how 
racism occurs in both obvious and more nuanced forms. Moreover, CRT's focus on the law is 
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also useful as legal rights and reform are clearly linked with education policy. Ladson-Billings 
(1998) draws on the U.S. example of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, focusing on legal 
measures to ensure desegregation in schools, equal access to education, as well as equal 
treatment for African American students. Present day Hungary is grappling with these same 
issues for Roma pupils, and CRT can provide fresh insight to these problems.  
 
Method and Case Selection 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
As a method, critical discourse analysis (CDA) has much to offer. Some of the key assumptions 
underpinning CDA pertinent for this research are that: structures and relations of power 
dynamics are discursive, discourse can be an ideological tool, discourses are only understood in 
their historical context, and CDA is an interpretative and explanatory method (Fairclough & 
Wodak, 2011). For this work, CDA is especially useful because it allows for a discussion of the 
context and meaning of policy discussion on Roma education in Hungary. CDA is a useful 
method for research interested in questions of power, hegemony, ideology, interests, 
institutions, and so on. These terms, among others, are what Teun van Dijk (2008) calls the 
vocabulary of the method (p. 87). A CDA begins with selecting the texts to analyze based on 
what the researcher seeks to explain. Next, the researcher reads the texts closely with the aim of 
identifying particular themes, words, references, narratives, and whatever other information is 
deemed useful, for instance, important statistics or facts. Because CDA is focused on context, the 
analysis includes close attention not only to what is said, but also to how it is said, in what way, 
and with what rhetorical strategies. Equally important for CDA is pointing out what is omitted 
and left unsaid (Bevir & Rhodes, 2002; van Dijk 2008 & 2011). The tenets of CRT discussed 
above inform the discourse analysis to gauge how race fits into the context of what is said. This 
is important because political rhetoric is the story political elites tell the public about particular 
issues.  
 
Documents for Analysis  
 
The first part of the study examines how Hungary self assesses the performance on Roma 
education policy in terms of what the aims are and what is being done. One text I selected to 
evaluate Hungary's position on their performance is the 2014 National Reform Programme of 
Hungary, which is a self-assessment report all member states must present to the European 
Council (EC) to indicate how the country is responding to EC recommendations in different 
policy areas set out to meet Europe 2020 strategy goals. Europe 2020 is the EU's ten-year 
growth plan to address social, political, and economic goals for member states (2015b). I also 
consult Hungary's National Social Inclusion Strategy—Extreme Poverty, Child Poverty, The 
Roma (2011). This document is prepared by the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice to 
address issues specific to the Roma in Hungary. I chose the National Reform Programme and 
the National Social Inclusion Strategy to reveal at the official level what legal measures and 
strategies are in place to improve the lives of the Roma, with attention to education policy 
initiatives. Next, EU and Council of Europe documents are analyzed to compare how the two 
normative watchdogs assess Hungary's performance. For the EU perspective on the two 
Hungarian initiatives, I consulted The Commission's Assessment of the Implementation of 
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Hungary's National Strategy (2014) and the European Commission's Council 
Recommendation of the National Reform Programme of Hungary (2014a), as well as The 
European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance's (ECRI) 2015 Report on Hungary. The 
ECRI, created by the Council of Europe, is an independent watchdog group that reports on 
human rights issues relating to racism and intolerance. This document was selected to highlight 
how Hungary's performance regarding race is critiqued at the European level, as the Council is a 
continent-wide human rights organization. 
The second part of the study examines data from two political parties in Hungary, Fidesz 
and Jobbik. Party manifestos and policy statements from party websites and news stories reveal 
how political elites frame Roma issues for the wider public. This is an important consideration 
because the general public gains knowledge of particular policy issues through political 
communication (party platforms, speeches, websites, etc.). Understanding how both the 
governing (Fidesz) and third largest and fastest rising (Jobbik) parties frame Roma issues 
provides insight into how PRR discourses set the context for the initiatives (and critiques of 
shortcomings) regarding Roma education. During this examination, I apply a CRT lens to pay 
close attention to how PRR discussions might be racialized, with thought to the potential 
impacts, particularly in the context of education. I also consult academic and NGO literature 
throughout the discussion to support the analysis.  
 
Data and Discussion 
 
This section of the paper is organized in three main parts. The first part of the discussion 
assesses how Hungarian government officials self-evaluate their performance in areas of Roma 
education policy. In the next two parts, I study EU and Council of Europe documents to 
demonstrate the differences between how these two watchdogs, independent of the Hungarian 
government, assess Hungary's policy performance on Roma education. The discussion wraps up 
by summarizing the key findings and differences on what the Hungarian government says it is 
doing compared with what is actually being done.  
 
Hungarian Self-Evaluation 
 
The National Reform Programme of Hungary (Government of Hungary, 2014a) reports on 
progress and goals in several policy areas but this analysis is narrowed to education and social 
inclusion. In Section III.6 “Education and social inclusion,” the Government of Hungary (2014a) 
insists that their national education strategies parallel the goals of Europe 2020, namely to offer 
high quality education to prepare students for the labour market, create inclusive education 
strategies for the Roma, and improve access to education at all levels. Significant reforms have 
taken place since 2010 with special focus on implementing programs to eradicate early school 
leaving. Policy making has focused on early childhood to facilitate any necessary interventions 
such as identifying risk factors for learning disabilities. New legislation includes mandatory 
kindergarten attendance from age 3 (previously age 5) starting September 2015 as per the Public 
Education Act. There are many programs in place to support early school leaving interventions 
including government funding for teachers and resources. Scholarship programs such as the 
Arany János Talent Fostering Programme recognize the economic and material disadvantage 
many Roma children and youth face. There is also a Public Education Development Strategy, 
which, in addition to ensuring quality education for pupils, promotes high-level training and 
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support for teachers (Section III.6). Promising programs, such as the ones listed above among 
others, all suggest progress. 
Another important report, the Situation of the Roma population of the National Social 
Inclusion Strategy (Government of Hungary, 2011), merges insights and recommendations 
from the Making Things Better for our Children National Strategy (Government of Hungary, 
2007a) and the Decade of Roma Integration Programme Strategic Plan (Government of 
Hungary, 2007b). Section 7.2 “Education and Training” of the Strategy notes that policy reform 
is aimed at young children with measures to help include the parents to ensure better success. 
Further, the Strategy emphasizes and follows the Making Things Better for our Children 
(2007a) assertion that: 
 
In an educational system creating opportunities, children, regardless of whether they come from 
poor, under-educated families, live in segregated living conditions, are disabled, migrants or blessed 
with outstanding talent, must receive education suited to their abilities and talents 
throughout their lifetime, without their education being influenced or affected by 
prejudices, stereotypes, biased expectations or discrimination. (Government of Hungary, 
2011, p. 74, bolding in original) 
 
This demonstrates that education equality laws are in place along with programs aimed at 
education for the Roma. However, problems are acknowledged in Section 3.2 of the Strategy 
(Government of Hungary, 2011) that highlight the challenges Roma children face in terms of 
barriers to education, and social inclusion more widely. One obstacle emphasized is the lack of 
coherent, reliable data and statistics, including follow-up data to measure policy 
program/intervention success. Another challenge to policy implementation is the segregation 
and ghettoization of Roma communities. Because the majority of Roma (over 60%) live in 
(mainly impoverished) rural areas, segregated communities are even further isolated. The 
Strategy also points out that social problems such high unemployment, lack of quality 
education, and high levels of personal debt are especially troublesome for the Roma and 
"segregation and discrimination are simultaneously the cause and consequence of these 
processes" (Government of Hungary, 2011, p. 25). This statement illustrates how Hungary's 
Roma are caught in a vicious cycle where bleak social indicators are caused by isolation and 
discrimination and vice versa. The situation is even worse for Romani women and girls. For 
example, only 5.8% of females have vocation skills compared to 17.5% of males (Government of 
Hungary, 2011). Such figures indicate intersectional discrimination by ethnicity and gender, 
further complicating policy solutions. In September 2014, the Government of Hungary made 
updates to the Strategy. Suggested reforms are targeted towards gathering better statistics and 
data, and, noteworthy here, including a cultural component into mainstream curriculum to 
foster awareness and appreciation for the breadth of Roma culture among non-Roma pupils. 
What remains undressed in the 2014 updates is the issue of segregation, which has come under 
international criticism (Government of Hungary, 2014b, September; United Nations, n.d.). 
 
EU Evaluation of Hungary's Performance 
 
The European Union serves as an important watchdog to follow up and monitor the progress 
that member states are making in key policy areas. The European Commission is responsible for 
producing many of these reports, accessible to the public. Pertinent to this study, the 
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Commission released their Assessment of the Implementation of Hungary's National Strategy 
(2014a). The Assessment points out key steps taken since Hungary's 2011 National Strategy 
while briefly highlighting measures needed to ensure efficacy. Regarding education policy, the 
Assessment notes that while measures have been taken to ensure equal access to quality 
education, more awareness must be raised to promote access. The report applauded efforts 
made to standardize and centralize curriculum to ensure that all Hungarian pupils receive the 
same level of education. While the policies on paper suggest a move in the right direction, the 
European Commission (2014a) asserts that impact assessments are needed to determine 
success. Another important policy initiative is the changes to mandatory school attendance. 
Children must begin pre-schooling at age 3 and pupils must stay in school until age 16. The 
necessary changes are aimed at ensuring the best possible start for children at an early stage and 
to target early school leaving by regulating attendance into the later teens. However, 
desegregation efforts are necessary in schools and this remains unaddressed (European 
Commission, 2014a). 
The problem of segregation is not restricted to education; spatial segregation also occurs 
within neighbourhoods. In response, the European Commission’s Assessment (2014a) also 
points out that desegregation efforts are also needed in housing policy. Segregation in schooling 
and neighbourhoods occurs in the larger context of discrimination against the Roma. The 
Commission (2014a) recognizes the need to tackle discrimination and calls for: strong laws in 
place, active efforts to eradicate anti-Roma rhetoric and hate speech, and raising awareness for 
Roma and non-Roma. The Commission notes these are the basic criteria for municipalities to 
receive EU funds conditionally targeted for improving equality and desegregation.  
 
Council of Europe Evaluation of Hungary's Performance 
 
An important watchdog group supported by the Council of Europe that keeps tabs on issues of 
human rights problems is the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). 
The ECRI takes stock of progress and draws attention to areas of concern. Like the Assessment 
of the Implementation of Hungary's National Strategy, the 2015 ECRI Report on Hungary 
expresses concern in areas of education and discrimination, but in far more detail. Echoing the 
other reports examined, the ECRI also affirms that, while there has been some progress made, 
serious problems remain, notably the uneven application of the law and ongoing anti-Roma 
discourse. According to the report, "the application of criminal law provisions on incitement to 
hatred remains extremely limited. A radical right-wing populist party [Jobbik] openly engages 
in anti-Roma, anti-Semitic, homophobic and xenophobic hate speech" (ECRI, 2015, p. 9). The 
rise of Jobbik in the polls is especially troubling as the party openly espouses racist rhetoric, 
even coining the term "Gypsy1 crime," discussed further in the paper. Worse yet, the ECRI 
warns, "... hate speech is not restricted to extremist parties and groups but occurs across the 
political spectrum. State officials and members of mainstream parties have been implicated" 
(ECRI, 2015, p. 16). 
The ECRI critiques the National Social Inclusion Strategy as ineffective based on the failure 
to confront the problem of segregation of school children. While there are laws against 
segregation, in practice there are appalling numbers of Roma children placed in special schools 
and classes with less challenging curriculum. Drawing data from the Roma Education Fund, the 
ECRI reports that between 20-90% of pupils in special education schools or classes are Roma. 
More troubling, many have been misdiagnosed based on little or no testing, and in some cases 
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without the child present during the assessment (ECRI, 2015). The ECRI (2015) insists the 
practice of inappropriately identifying Roma children as “learning disabled” must cease in order 
to meet goals of social inclusion, quality education for all children, and opportunities to escape 
poverty. The 2013 European Court of Human Rights judgment on Horvath v. Kiss offers hope: 
 
Two [Hungarian] Roma argued that because of ethnicity, they were wrongly placed in a school for the 
mentally disabled, and that their rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR (right to 
education) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) had been breached. (2015, pp. 30-31) 
 
The Court ruled in their favour and ordered changes. Hungarian authorities have responded 
with new evaluation tests, teacher-training programmes aimed at inclusive education, and new 
laws with strict benchmarks for diagnosing mental disabilities in children (ECRI, 2015). It is too 
early to evaluate the success of the new initiatives. Time and close monitoring will tell how 
effective these changes will be in Hungary.  
 
In Sum 
 
In this section of the paper, the Hungarian self-assessment on progress in Roma education 
policy was compared to the EU and the Council of Europe's evaluation of actual progress to 
determine if there was a disjuncture between policy and practice. The evidence examined 
suggests this is the case. 
From the Hungarian government’s view, the picture of progress looks good. National 
education strategies are in line with Europe 2020 goals of high quality education with inclusive 
education strategies for the Roma and improved access to education at all levels. There are 
significant reforms and many new programmes in place. However, segregation and 
discrimination are recognized as ongoing challenges. From the EU perspective, the situation is 
more complex and the problems of segregation and discrimination are serious and require 
immediate addressing beyond merely acknowledging the problem. According to the European 
Commission, there are initiatives in place but continual monitoring and data collection are 
needed. In another report, the Commission also summarized the European Council's 
recommendation that progress and efficacy of the new laws needs to be monitored (Section 15, 
2014b). 
The Council of Europe's ECRI report is particularly damning. The report acknowledges the 
hopeful reforms made to date and cites a landmark court case but the ECRI also insists that 
much more work must be done in order for meaningful change to occur. The report exposes how 
the hostile racist environment for Hungarian Roma at all levels of society informs and directs 
policy that results in dismal social indicators of progress. The next section of the paper grapples 
with why this disconnect between policy and practice persists despite good legal reforms and 
programmes aimed at combatting social exclusion of the Roma.  
 
Populist Radical Right (PRR) Discourse: Framing Race 
 
As noted in the previous section, the Hungarian Roma live with widespread discrimination 
leading to many social problems including low education levels, segregation, and 
intergenerational cycles of poverty. This situation persists even with laws, policies, and 
programmes aimed at eradicating exclusion. An examination of how the Roma are negatively 
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framed in populist radical right discourse helps explain why there is a mismatch between policy 
and actual practice. Discourses are never neutral and they are inherently political because how 
certain issues are framed (e.g., what the problem is, the extent, etc.) informs what policy action 
is taken. Political parties (like Jobbik and Fidesz studied here) are powerful agents of social 
influence. Jobbik and Fidesz are certainly not the only groups espousing racism toward the 
Roma in Hungary, but they are significant because parties in power make decisions and direct 
policy. For instance, Nagy et al. (2013) note that part of Jobbik's success is explained by their 
racist positions against the Roma, which resonate with the public that have long ostracized the 
Roma community. In this way, racist rhetoric fuels anti-Roma attitudes and justifies 
questionable policies. Furthermore, PRR parties not only influence the general public, but also 
other parties. In the case of Hungary, this is especially concerning because Jobbik—on the 
extreme far right—influences Fidesz, the party in power. As Nagy et al. (2013) put it, "Overall, 
then, we can see that the ideology advocated by Jobbik is being implemented by the Fidesz 
government (with its two-thirds majority in parliament) in a slightly watered down version, but 
without any major changes in its tenets" (p. 248). The analysis unfolds with an examination of 
how Jobbik, then Fidesz, frame Roma policy with attention to what is said, in what manner, 
using which rhetorical strategies, and where appropriate, what is left unsaid. Within the 
discourses revealed, race is located and the findings are critiqued. The analysis concludes with 
thoughts on possible implications.  
 
Discourses of Jobbik 
 
The analysis begins with Jobbik because this party represents the most extreme case of populist 
radicalism in Hungary. Jobbik's racist position is obvious and has been widely critiqued by 
groups like the ECRI who also describe the party as racist, fascist, homophobic, and hyper-
nationalist (2015). Jobbik is a newer party, founded in 2003, and is Hungary's third largest 
party. The rapidity of Jobbik's success is remarkable. The party broke through in the 2009 
European Parliament election. This was a big surprise as Hungary's party system was 
considered fully consolidated and locked in, leaving no room for new parties. Jobbik went from 
less than 1% to 15% in one year, a situation that is unparalleled among European far right 
parties (Karácsony & Róna, 2011). Nationally, Jobbik has been enjoying ever-increasing success, 
securing second place in 18 of 19 counties in the 2014 local elections. Jobbik's strong positions 
against the Roma are influential and resonate with the public (ECRI, 2015). Consider the images 
conjured up by the following excerpt:  
 
One Sunday morning in December 2007, some three hundred extreme nationalists dressed in black 
uniforms marched in military formation through a Hungarian village, protesting against what they 
called “Roma [Gypsy] delinquency.” They then gathered at a rally, where speakers demanded that 
Roma be segregated from mainstream society. (LeBor, 2008, p. 34) 
 
The extreme nationalists LeBor writes of were members of the Magyar Gárda (MG) 
(Hungarian Guard), a paramilitary group founded by Gábor Vona (Jobbik's leader) to protect 
Hungary's values and culture. While the MG was outlawed in 2009, the group quickly 
reassembled as the Új Magyar Gárda (New Hungarian Guard) and Jobbik's extreme stance 
against the Roma persists. 
From Jobbik's (2015c) stated policies on the party website, they revere the historical role of 
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the Church and insist the Church will be vital to Roma integration, which suggests this is an 
important policy area. However, the Roma are curiously omitted from Jobbik's dialogue on 
ideas to reform youth, employment, and cultural programmes. In the Education Policy section 
of the website, Roma are not specifically mentioned except in the statement, "We will create a 
National Institute of Gypsy Methodology, whose purpose will be to develop and realize 
educational methods designed to alleviate the unique educational situation of Hungary’s Roma" 
(2015a). The party does not go on to explain how they understand the "unique educational 
situation" or to clarify any details of the "educational methods" they mention. Further, this 
statement is at odds with inclusive education that the Europe 2020 goals support. In another 
statement on education reform, Jobbik (2015a) states that, "We will set up a boarding school 
system for children coming from disadvantaged families." Although the Roma are not 
mentioned specifically, it is common knowledge that Roma children, and especially females, are 
the most disadvantaged group in Hungary in terms of poverty, education, housing, and health. 
By implication then, the Roma are the key target group for such a boarding school system. State 
legislated removal of children from their home communities into a boarding school system is 
chillingly reminiscent of the Indian Residential School system enacted by the Canadian 
Government in assimilation efforts to "destroy the Indian in the child" (Funk-Unrau & Snyder, 
2007). It is further troubling that Jobbik's official position for solving inequality in education is 
further segregation, a policy that directly conflicts with the Europe 2020 goals and the current 
national strategies and laws in Hungary. 
In the Party Manifesto, Jobbik positions themselves as the defenders of the nation with a 
“get tough on crime” approach. They pledge to address "the situation of the Gypsy community" 
and later assert that, "We [Jobbik] cannot accept laws that guarantee more and more legal 
security for criminals and provide less and less protection for honest citizens!" (Jobbik, 2003, 
§3). In the Manifesto, Jobbik does not elaborate on what they mean by "situation of the Gypsy 
community" other than the obvious implication that the status quo is unacceptable. Later 
statements made by Jobbik clarify their intentions to solve the problem, namely by linking 
excess crime to the Roma community, even creating the moniker “Gypsy crime.” Scholars like 
Vidra and Fox (2014) point out that the term “Gypsy crime” is dangerous because it becomes 
taken for granted and accepted by the general public. Use of such a moniker is an example of 
using lexicons or ideological positioning as a rhetorical strategy. A lexicon or ideological position 
happens when certain groups are stereotyped with particular behaviour to the point where the 
stereotype becomes a metaphor for the group (Gilbert, 2013). In this case, Roma becomes 
synonymous with crime and vice versa in both political discourse and in the public imagination. 
The term “Gypsy crime” casts a different light on Jobbik's earlier mentioned Manifesto, which 
differentiates criminals from “honest citizens.” The discursive implication of labelling the Roma 
as criminal is blaming the group for deviant behaviour and creating further distance from 
mainstream society (Jiwani, 2009). Jobbik rebuts that the term is not evidence of racism; rather 
it is a policy problem the party is prepared to fix. According to the party website,  
 
Jobbik has suggested an approach to tackling gypsy crime that deals with both its cause and its 
effects. The combination of a dedicated rural police service, or Gendarmerie, on the one hand; and 
social security and educational reforms on the other. All such changes would be totally colour-blind 
and would apply to all. (Jobbik, 2015b, §4-5) 
 
Despite the claim otherwise, the term “Gypsy crime” remains problematic as a lexicon and 
494 
Race and Populist Radical Right Discourses: Implications for Roma Education Policy in Hungary 
 
even the solutions offered paint a “they need to be more like us” type of picture that shows 
disregard and lack of respect for cultural difference. Embedded in a term like “Gypsy crime” is 
what Critical Race scholars like Sherene Razack (1998; 2008) call a culturalist explanation for 
behaviour. A culturalist explanation conflates certain behaviours as inherent to the culture, 
thereby blaming entire ethnic groups as culturally flawed. Other examples include construing all 
Muslims as backwards with a propensity for violence, or all Indigenous peoples in North 
America as prone to alcoholism and criminality. This is a coded form of racism that implies 
certain ethnic groups have tendencies toward deviance. Additionally, Critical Race Theory is 
deeply critical of attempts to “white wash” laws and policies as seen in Jobbik's statement that 
"All changes would be totally colour-blind." Applying a one-size-fits-all model to policy can only 
expose and remedy the most extreme forms of racism and inequality and cannot address 
systematic, every day racism (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012).  
 
Discourses of Fidesz 
 
Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, is the leader of Fidesz. Fidesz is the current and 
largest political party in power since 2010. Fidesz is commonly known as a conservative right 
party that began in 1988. However, in recent years there has been a great deal of media and 
scholarly attention pointing to Fidesz' far right rhetoric and illiberal policies. A striking example 
are the new constitutional reforms which weaken equality rights for minorities and include a 
complex amending formula that gives Fidesz a great deal of power. The point here is not to label 
Fidesz as a PRR party, but rather to emphasize and critique the PRR discourse strategies the 
party uses. The politics of Fidesz, such as the many anti-Roma statements made by the party 
and its affiliates, fit the definition of PRR strategy (Pirro, 2014, p. 261). On the surface, Fidesz 
appears much more moderate than the extreme right Jobbik, and the times when Fidesz has 
come under fire are often dismissed as atypical and excused as a vote-winning strategy. This is 
dubious because, "a party [can't] really take radical positions that are 'just strategic' for most of 
its existence" (Mudde, 2015, §12). Because Fidesz' discourses are far more nuanced than 
Jobbik's, CRT is especially useful for uncovering racialized frames. 
In the Fidesz Party Manifesto, there is virtually no mention of the Roma except to state that, 
"the integration and advancement of Roma citizens is a common cause for all" (2007, p. 23). To 
achieve these goals, the party claims that education is the top policy priority, especially for 
children aged seven to eight years (2007). In the manifesto there is no mention of 
discrimination or racism in Hungary at all, and, while equality is discussed, it is only in terms of 
equality among new and old member states of the European Union. This demonstrates that 
Fidesz' conception of national inclusion and equality is for the ethnic Hungarian diaspora across 
Hungary's borders rather than acceptance and promotion of an ethnically plural Hungary (Fox 
et al., 2010). That means for Orbán, the diaspora community takes political and policy priority 
over the Roma. While perhaps unintended, the consequence is preferential treatment of ethnic 
Hungarians across the border that fit into the mainstream national norm and are, in the view of 
Hungarian policy makers, “more like us.” This is a latent, yet still racist, position seen in other 
cases, such as Canadian immigration attitudes towards temporary foreign workers from Mexico 
(Gilbert, 2013). There are other examples of concerning attitudes and statements from Fidesz 
members and far right rhetoric is becoming more and more commonplace for the party 
(Verseck, 2013). 
A recent Supreme Court ruling decided that an all-Roma primary school in Nyíregyháza, in 
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Northeast Hungary, did not constitute a legitimate case of segregation as parents could have 
sent their children via bus to another school. The school was closed in 2007 after the Chance for 
Children Foundation (an international NGO that advocates for at-risk youth) lobbied against the 
school based on concerns of racial segregation. Local authorities allowed the Greek Catholic 
Church to take charge and the school opened again in 2011, leading to an appeal to the Supreme 
Court (Hungary Matters, 2015). The ruling caused upset, and Fidesz member and Minister of 
Human Capacities, Zoltán Balog, backed the court decision and insisted that, "only a badly 
intentioned reading of the public education law passed at the end of last year could discern any 
legitimisation of school segregation" and that extra teaching resources would ensure the 
students received a quality education (MTI, 2015, §1). Opposition co-leader Timea Szabo 
disagreed noting that Balog's suport set a dangerous precedent for creating a segregation 
loophole in certain cases (MTI, 2014). The director of Chance for Children and Romani activist, 
Erzsebet Mohacsi, agreed with Szabo, noting that veiled forms of segregation are common in 
Hungary: "This is done all over the country. You can't find religious schools with mixed kids. 
They're either elite schools for the majority or Gypsy schools" (Simon, 2014). Minister Balog's 
failure to respond directly to these important critiques and simply stand behind the court ruling 
shows an example of a public official of accepting the word of the law as the most commonsense 
and legitimate form of truth finding. What remains unquestioned and unaddressed in a 
meaningful way is the ongoing problem of segregation both in schools and in neighbourhoods. 
In a more blatant example of racist attitudes toward the Roma, Fidesz co-founder and 
personal friend of Orbán, Zsolt Bayer, was quoted in Magyar Hírlap, a daily national 
newspaper, saying, "a considerable proportion of the gypsies is not fit to live among people. 
They are animals. These animals should certainly not exist. The problem must be solved—
immediately and no matter how" (Verseck, 2013, §9). The article stirred a great deal of 
controversy in Hungary and Europe, but Fidesz responded meekly by trying to distance the 
party from Bayer saying he was "stating his own view" (Verseck, 2013, §10). The ECRI notes 
another similar incident when, in 2014, theatre director Imre Kerényi, Orbán's personal 
representative on cultural matters was quoted saying, "the theatre world should be liberated 
from the 'lobby of the fags'" (2015, p. 16). Fidesz' reaction, or lack thereof, to incidents like Bayer 
and Kerényi demonstrate the “few bad apples” style of logic. This strategy suggests these are 
isolated incidents and not representative of the group. By allocating blame on a few individuals 
that may need reprimanding denies how racism is rampant and institutionalized (Tator & 
Henry, 2006). What remains unquestioned are the norms, beliefs, and values that underpin how 
such incidents can occur in the first place (van Dijk, 2008). 
It is difficult to argue that such incidents of racism are not representative of Fidesz when 
they keep happening in different contexts, even from leader Viktor Orbán himself. In a public 
statement responding to criticism that Hungary was not pulling its weight regarding the Syrian 
refugee crisis, Orbán said: 
 
It is a historical feature of Hungary that it is home to hundreds of thousands of Roma citizens. This is 
a fact that no one can object to or call into question in any way. At the same time, however, we cannot 
require others […] to follow suit and demand that they should also live with a substantial Roma 
minority. (Government of Hungary, 2015) 
 
By comparing the Roma to Syrian refugees, Orbán is implying the Roma are not “regular” 
Hungarians who are a welcome part of the social fabric; rather, they are outsiders with whom 
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Hungary was historically burdened. The Roma community reacted to this statement and Acs 
mayor Bela Lakatos (Hungary's only Roma mayor) resigned from the party as a result (Escritt, 
2015). Some scholars note that racism has become increasingly acceptable in Hungary (Vidra & 
Fox, 2014). Blatant and coded incidents of racism discussed above suggest they are right.  
 
Implications 
 
Racialized discourses by the Jobbik and Fidesz parties have far reaching consequences for Roma 
education in Hungary. Using racist and culturalist explanations, PRR discourses frame the 
Roma as outsiders and troublemakers. This translates into less attention and public pressure for 
politicians to remedy inequities in education, and instead shifts focus on the need for protection 
against Roma criminals and deviants. In the case of Jobbik, strong anti-Roma attitudes are 
prevalent and obvious. Assumptions about the Roma are highly racialized and culturalist, as 
exemplified by the term "gypsy crime." By framing the Roma as inherently prone to criminal 
deviance, they are seen as a problem and as outsiders posing a threat to peaceful (non-Roma) 
Hungarian society. Racist attitudes can often inform policy and, when that happens, 
discriminatory policies are unquestioned and become the logical, appropriate way to govern 
society (Razack, 2008). Patterns of racialized policy can become cyclical when ethnicity or race 
is used as an indicator of crime, which leads to over-policing certain neighbourhoods, resulting 
in more arrests that suggest further evidence of criminality (Quigley, 1994). This can further 
entrench Roma “issue ownership” and foster an “only Jobbik cares and can protect us” logic 
among voters. Increased popularity of Jobbik is a troubling prospect for minorities in Hungary. 
Jobbik is the not the only concern for social inclusion in Hungary. Fidesz has also engaged 
racialized dialogue, at times in more nuanced ways than Jobbik, at other times just as overtly. 
Either way, the prospects for a healthy democracy are bleak. Cas Mudde (2015) puts it this way: 
 
Mainstream parties such as Fidesz may be more harmful for liberal democracy than radical right 
parties such as Jobbik because they often have the experience, power and skills to implement illiberal 
policies. What's more, mainstream parties tend to have supporters in important political positions 
both within their own countries, such as within the bureaucracy and judiciary, and beyond. (§18) 
 
We have already seen Fidesz' policies and exertion of power in practice, namely with the 
widely criticized constitutional reforms. Employing distancing strategies such as “a few bad 
apples” in the party and the generic nods to equality and social inclusion seen in the Party 
Manifesto, Fidesz effectively silences racism that is ongoing yet not confronted or questioned. 
With either Jobbik or Fidesz in power, both espouse PRR discourse and inform policy in 
racialized ways. The result for the Roma is a hostile political climate intolerant of difference or 
diversity. Racism in society spells trouble for education policy and opportunity (Robbins, 2010). 
For instance, Ram (in press) asks how segregation of school children can be effectively tackled 
when mainstream society supports it. The problem is further complicated when officials support 
court rulings like the one in Nyíregyháza that create exceptions for segregation. There are some 
promising educational reforms but without studies and data to demonstrate their effectiveness it 
is unclear how these policies will play out in practice. With weak enforcement mechanisms, it is 
likely that the decade of reform and improvement will only yield partial results (Varga, 2013). 
More importantly, unless racism and discrimination are confronted, educational strategies and 
reform efforts will only perpetuate the status quo. Drawing on lessons from the African 
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American experience in the United States that relate well to the Hungarian case, Critical Race 
scholar Ladson-Billings (1998) illustrates how. First, curriculum will remain problematic. 
Embedded in what knowledge children must have are stereotypes, historical omissions, and a 
one-sided view of history and the now. Classroom instruction and teacher training can pose 
problems, too. Education policy is consistently aimed at finding the correct approach to teaching 
certain groups deemed as difficult to teach or a special case. Oftentimes, such approaches are 
evaluated in a success-fail binary: 
 
This race-neutral perspective purports to see deficiency as an individual phenomenon. Thus, 
instruction is conceived as a generic set of teaching skills that should work for all students. When 
these strategies or skills fail to achieve desired results, the students, not the techniques, are found to 
be lacking. (Ladson-Billings, 1998, p. 19) 
 
Regarding how students are assessed, there is often a gap between what is being measured 
compared to what the pupil actually knows (Ladson-Billings, 1998). Educators around the globe 
have long critiqued standardized tests. Hopefully, the new evaluation tests that Hungary has 
adopted will be more sensitive.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The purpose of this paper was to examine the role of race in Roma education policy in Hungary. 
The paper made two key arguments. First, how Hungary self-evaluates their performance in 
educational reform was compared to how the EU and the Council of Europe assessed Hungary's 
performance. This comparison revealed a disjuncture between official policy and actual progress 
on the ground. Second, the paper argued that a political climate of populist right radicalism, 
which espoused and fueled racialized discourses about the Roma, partially revealed why 
seemingly good laws and policies produced disappointing results in practice. 
By way of concluding, the paper offers three key recommendations for improving the 
situation, and wraps up by suggesting further avenues of study. The first, and arguably most 
critical, recommendation for improving education policy involves seriously confronting the 
deeply engrained, structural racism about the Roma. Education policies are not created in a 
vacuum. They are written within a particular context, and so without tackling racism in wider 
society, education policies cannot fully overcome problems such as segregation, early school 
leaving, etc. Second, policies aimed at education are well meaning and this author agrees that 
for Roma children (the next generation) education is key, but the non-Roma, majority 
population must also be better educated about the realities the Roma face in order to achieve 
understanding and cultural sensitivity. This would need to involve a discussion beyond 
superficial caricatures about the Roma culture. Finally, the paper exposed the mismatch 
between how Hungary self-assesses compared with the EU and Council of Europe's concerns 
over progress. The mismatch shows that close monitoring and reporting (by the EU and Council 
of Europe as independent watchdogs) of segregation and other policies is required to ensure 
effectiveness and draw attention to potential legal loopholes (as suggested by the controversy 
over the Nyíregyháza ruling discussed earlier in the paper). 
This study examined one small piece of Hungary's policy puzzle. Further studies that could 
surely produce fruitful results would be more theoretical work on how Fidesz' policies, while not 
as extreme as Jobbik's, are also implicated by systematic racism and more policy-oriented work 
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closely examining the intersection of race/ethnicity with gender on Roma policy. For now, there 
are several new policies and initiatives in place to improve educational prospects for Hungarian 
Roma. Although there is ample room for skepticism, only time will tell how these will play out.  
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Note 
 
1 “Gypsy” is the name given to the Roma people by outsiders who initially thought that the Roma migrated 
from Egypt, where Gypsy is a shortened version of “Egyptian.” The preferred and more accurate name is 
Roma, derived from Dom, meaning a person or a human being in Sanskrit, the original language of 
northern India. The use of “Gypsy” in this paper is only to reflect the rhetoric of the people and 
organizations referenced. Otherwise, the terms Roma and Romani are used to acknowledge how the 
Roma identify themselves. 
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